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**RESERVE COMPONENT CAPABILITIES VS.
U.S. PEACE OPERATIONS ROLES AND MISSIONS**

BY

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U.S. PEACE OPERATIONS ROLES AND MISSIONS

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ABSTRACT

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The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union initiated a major change in the security strategy of the United States. This change was signified by a drastic reduction in United States military force structure and personnel. Yet, as the total force decreased, the total number of United States Army military operations has dramatically increased. As the PERSTEMPO has increased for the active duty Army and its Reserve Components, Congress has continued to actively pursue additional Defense Department budget cuts as a way to help balance the nation's budget. Since 1989 Congress has authorized three major Defense Department studies; the Bottoms-Up Review (BUR), the Committee on Roles and Missions (CORM), and the currently ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This paper reviews the past impact of the BUR and the CORM and then the potential of the new QDR to impact on military force structure, roles, and missions.

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Introduction: This paper will focus on the post Cold War strategy changes of the United States (US) and its impact on the roles, missions and force structure of the US Military, in particular the US Army. Since the end of the Cold War both the Administration and the US Congress have looked closely at the size of the US military and at the cost required to maintain its force structure and capabilities. Their concern with the size of the federal deficit forced them to look for opportunities to reduce expenses, and one of these was through a reduction in the size of the US military. A US military reduction was seen as a quick and easy way to dramatically reduce expenses and help to balance the nation's budget. Since 1989 Congress has authorized three major Defense Department studies, the Bottoms-Up Review (BUR), the Committee on Roles and Missions (CORM), and now the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR is designed to review the nation's National Security Strategy and to compare that strategy to the US Military Strategy, insuring that the right force structure and capabilities are ready and available to accomplish the strategic military mission.

Background: The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 signified the end of the Cold War between the United States (US) and Russia. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold

War threat also identified the end of the containment security policy which had been utilized by the US in their relationship with the Soviet Union. For almost 45 years, this containment policy had been based on the ability of the US and its Allies to defensively counter the threat of Communist offensive aggression by the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War a different strategy had to be formulated in order to deal with the new world order of nations -- a world order without the bipolar balance of power struggle between the US and Russia.

In the post Cold War era, the nation has returned to collective security as a key strategic concept. This return to collective security is a reiteration of the original premise used in the establishment of the League of Nations following World War I and again when the United Nations (UN) was established following World War II. The UN was established at the conclusion of World War II as a world agency or collective body of individual nations designed to establish a post war order of collective security that would secure peace, advance global prosperity, alleviate poverty and unemployment, and promote human rights worldwide.

An important part of the UN's role and one which is important to our nation's post Cold War strategy is included in Chapter VI of the UN Charter titled -- PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (ARTICLES 33-38). This defines the specific peacekeeping tools and activities used by the UN to arbitrate, negotiate, and/or coordinate peaceful resolutions to disputes between nations.¹ The peacekeeping tools and activities identified within Chapter VI are the peaceful ways and means used to maintain the collective security of the member nations of the UN. In addition to Chapter VI actions, the UN Charter also provides access to Chapter VII actions. Chapter VII is titled -- ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION (ARTICLES 39-51).² Chapter VII defines the measures and options available to the Security Council of the UN (of which the US is a member) in the event of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. These options include political and diplomatic measures and also provide for the use of armed military force to insure that peace is either maintained or regained.

With the Cold War's end, and in the view of the collective security options provided through the UN, some members of the US Congress felt that the requirement to maintain a massive military

organization within the United States Defense Department was no longer necessary. Since that time Congress had been looking at many different ways and opportunities to cut spending and thus reduce the federal deficit.

DEFENSE DOWNSIZING: The Bottoms-Up Review - the Pentagon's first major review of defense strategy following the end of the Cold War. The first tool used to analyze and evaluate the nation's defense programs after the collapse of the Cold War was the "Bottoms-Up Review" (BUR). The BUR was initiated in March of 1993 by the Secretary of Defense Mr. Les Aspin, and the final report was published to Congress in October of 1993. The BUR was intended to "select the right strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure to provide for America's defense in the post-Cold War era".³

In the development of the BUR, "a step-by step process was used to develop key assumptions, broad principles, and general objectives and translate them into a specific plan for our strategy, forces, and defense resources".⁴ These steps included:

1. Assessing the post Cold War era, and in particular the new dangers, opportunities, and uncertainties it presents.

2. Devising a US defense strategy to protect and advance our interests in this new period.
3. Constructing building blocks of forces to implement this strategy.
4. Combining these force building blocks to produce options for our overall force structure.
5. Complementing the force structure with weapons acquisition programs to modernize our forces, defense foundations to sustain them, and policy initiatives to address new dangers and take advantage of new opportunities.

One of the primary objectives of the BUR was to assess just what the new dangers would be to our national interests during the post-cold war era. The BUR assessed that the new dangers would fall into four broad categories:⁵

1. Dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including dangers associated with the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well as those associated with the large stocks of these weapons that remain in the former Soviet Union.
2. Regional dangers, posed primarily by the threat of large-scale aggression by major regional powers with interests antithetical to our own, but also by the potential for smaller, often internal, conflicts based on ethnic or religious animosities, state-sponsored terrorism, and subversion of friendly governments.
3. Dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.
4. Economic dangers to our national security which could result if we fail to build a strong, competitive and growing economy.

Along with many new and different dangers to our national interests and those of allies, the post-Cold War also opened up an era of new opportunities. "Realistic aspirations that, if we dedicate ourselves to pursue worthy goals, we can reach a world of greater safety, freedom, and prosperity. Our armed forces can contribute to this objective. In brief, we see new opportunities to."⁶

1. Expand and adapt our existing security partnerships and alliances and build a larger community of democratic nations.
2. Promote new regional security arrangements and alliances to improve deterrence and reduce the potential for aggression by hostile regional powers.
3. Implement the dramatic reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the former Soviet Union achieved in the START I AND II treaties.
4. Protect and advance our security with fewer resources, freeing excess resources to be invested in other areas vital to our prosperity.

Four separate force structure options were analyzed during the Bottoms-Up-Review process. The options were designed to meet successively more demanding major regional contingencies (MRC's) or defense strategies. These options were:⁷

Option 1 - Win one MRC. This option would require the fewest resources, allowing us to reduce the defense budget and redirect excess funds to other national priorities.

Option 2 - Win one MRC, while holding in a second MRC. This option does free some additional resources for other national priorities, but is premised on the risky assumption that, if we are challenged in one region, respond to the aggression, and then are challenged shortly afterwards in another region, a sizable block of our remaining forces will have the stamina and capability to defeat the first adversary, move to another region - possibly several thousand miles distant, and defeat a second adversary.

Option 3 - Win two nearly simultaneous MRC's. This option would provide sufficiently capable and flexible military forces to position the United States to be a leader and shaper of global affairs for positive change.

Option 4 - Win two nearly simultaneous MRC's plus conduct smaller operations. This option would allow us to fight and win two MRC's nearly simultaneously while continuing to sustain some other overseas presence and perhaps an additional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or intervention type operation.

The decision was made by the Department of Defense during the course of the BUR analysis that the United States must field military forces capable of fighting and winning two major MRC's that would occur nearly simultaneously (Option 3). With the selection of Option 3, the US force structure shown below (Figure 1) was identified as the forces required to implement the selected defense strategy.

**Bottoms-Up Review
plan for
US Force Structure
(Figure 1)⁸**

| | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| ARMY | 10 divisions (active) 5+ divisions (reserve) |
| NAVY | 11 aircraft carriers (active) 1 aircraft carrier (reserve/training) 45-55 attack submarines 346 ships |
| AIR FORCE | 13 fighter wings (active) 7 fighter wings (reserve) Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2) |
| MARINE CORPS | 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 174,000 personnel (active end-strength) 42,000 personnel (reserve end-strength) |
| STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES (BY 2003) | 18 ballistic missile submarines Up to 94 B-52H bombers 20 B-2 bombers 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead) |

Since its completion, and even though it's received mixed reviews, the BUR has provided the framework for the collective security defense strategy of the US. According to some, an initial analysis regarded the document as something special, a thorough and complete review which looked at all sides of US defense and military issues. In addition, it was also thought to be a comprehensive and complete defense strategy document with which the American people and their government could build a solid and cost effective military for the defense of the nation.

Overall, defense cuts had been quite substantial since the end of the Cold War in 1989. The Bottoms-Up Review plans for force structure changes have been followed and that has also

meant an appropriate downswing in the numbers of military personnel in both the Active and Reserve Components (Figure 2).

**THE FY 1997 CLINTON DEFENSE PROGRAM
AND MILITARY FORCE TRENDS
(Figure 2)⁹**

| Clinton Program: | 1989 | 1997 | Target |
|--|----------|----------|----------|
| Active Forces | Cold War | Actual | Force |
| Army Divisions | 18 | 10 | 10 |
| Navy Aircraft Carrier | 16 | 11 | 11 |
| Navy Air Wings | 13 | 10 | 10 |
| Navy Surface and Attack Submarines | 287 | 192 | 161-171 |
| Marine Divisions and Air Wings | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Airforce Tact Wings | 25 | 13 | 13 |
| <u>Reserve Forces</u> | | | |
| Army Combat Brigades | 57 | 42 | 42 |
| Navy Air Wings | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Navy Aircraft Carrier | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Other Navy Ships | 26 | 17 | 15 |
| Marine Division and Air Wing | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Air Force Tact Wings | 12 | 7 | 7 |
| <u>Nuclear Deterrent</u> | | | |
| Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles | 1,000 | 580 | 500 |
| Ballistic Missile Subs (Missiles) | 32 (576) | 17 (408) | 14 (336) |
| Bombers | 359 | 174 | 86 |
| <u>Mobility Forces</u> | | | |
| Strategic Airlift | 431 | 389 | 283 |
| Aircraft | | | |
| Sealift Ships | 162 | 152 | 149 |
| <u>Military Personnel</u> | | | |
| (In Thousands) | | | |
| Active Forces | 2,130 | 1,457 | 1,418 |
| Guard and Reserve Forces | 1,171 | 901 | 893 |

Since it's completion, however, the BUR has taken some serious criticism and that criticism has continued to grow since its publication. An assessment of the BUR completed in February of 1994 by the Defense Budget Project and authored by a Mr. Andrew F. Krepinevich stated "that the BUR makes neither a persuasive case for its recommended defense posture, nor is it likely to be affordable". In addition, it stated that the BUR offered a defense program that:¹⁰

1. Allocates primary emphasis to maintaining US military capability over the near-term future, at the expense of preserving US military potential over the long-term. Essentially, the BUR maintains the US planning perspective that existed during the Cold War: it focuses on the near-term future, and on the most familiar threats, as opposed to the greatest or most likely threats to the national security, which will probably appear in the next decade, at the earliest.
2. Advocated dedicating the bulk of US defense resources to meeting the requirement to wage two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) - without allied support if need be - to quick and decisive victory. The BUR does not provide a convincing argument for this planning requirement, especially when the opportunity costs are considered.
3. Emphasizes planning to refight the Gulf War more effectively rather than preparing for the challenges of the next decade. For example, the Third World regional powers with aggressive designs are likely to adopt substantially different operational concepts and force structures than those anticipated by the BUR in designing its force requirements for future MRC's.

4. Fails to set priorities between preparing for major regional conflicts, and preparing for unconventional operations, such as peacemaking. Furthermore, the BUR appears to assume that forces trained and oriented for conventional conflict environments can be readily shifted to unconventional operations with little or no loss of military effectiveness. The US military's recent experience would seem to indicate this assumption is unfounded.

5. Fails to make a convincing case for its recommended twelve-carrier Navy. The US experience in the Cold War, in the Gulf War, the dramatic changes that have occurred in military capabilities, and even Defense Department sponsored studies do not sustain the BUR recommendations.

6. Fails to take into sufficient account the potentially profound influence that an emerging military revolution could have on the determinants of military effectiveness, and the parameters for an effective defense investment strategy.

7. Is unaffordable and becomes progressively less affordable over time, given projected resource constraints. The BUR five-year plan may be short of some \$33-50 billion. Over the longer term, the BUR defense posture could well suffer funding shortages of some \$20 billion per year.

8. Is, finally, critically handicapped by the Administration's failure thus far to enunciate a clear national security strategy that defines the American military's role in the post Cold war era.

In addition to the problems identified above, the BUR didn't effectively look at the roles and missions of the US Armed Forces. Since the Berlin Wall came down, Congress had been looking for ways and means to balance the US budget and that look also included the US Defense Department. During their search,

Congress expressed a view that the BUR was inadequate in respect to the roles and missions question and a requirement still existed for a total "outside" review of the roles and missions of the armed forces. It was decided that this review should then be used as a tool to consolidate missions, to refine and define the roles of the individual services, and to reduce the total defense budget of the United States.

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

(CORM): On 30 November of 1993 Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994, PL 103-160. In addition to a budget for 1994, this act also established the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. Congress charged the Commission to "review...the appropriateness...of the current allocations of roles, missions, and functions among the Armed Forces; evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions, and functions."¹¹

Although the directive as written in the above paragraph appears direct and to the point, and it does ask for a specific product from the CORM, the Commission opted to bypass the "hard" roles and missions question. Instead, the CORM Commission report

answered the following, "The question is no longer "who does what," but how do we ensure that the right set of capabilities is identified, developed, and fielded to meet the needs of unified commanders?" "What this means to those who read this report is that you are not going to see a listing of roles and mission disputes among the Services, or sharp Commission recommendations on how to resolve those disputes. You are not going to find a series of "put and take" statements that rearrange US forces from one Service to the other."¹²

Armed Services Roles and Mission changes: Although both the BUR and the CORM reviewed to some extent the roles and missions question during their analysis of the Department of Defense (DOD), their actual interest in consolidating the roles and missions aspects of the Active Services were minimal. Instead, due to the total downsizing of the services, they were more interested in determining which roles and missions should be transferred to the Reserve Components. As an example, in the Army these transferable missions were primarily in the Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) areas. However, at the same time the BUR and the CORM were extremely interested in maintaining the Combat Arms roles and picking up new collective security roles and missions for the active forces in the areas of

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and military operations other than war (MOOTW).

In order to implement its plan for the utilization of Army Reserve Component soldiers, the BUR's Army plan stated that: "Achieving an Army force capable of meeting new security requirements demands adapting the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to the new defense strategy, improving and accelerating the process of readying forces for deployment, and utilizing the Army Guard and Reserve in areas where they have performed effectively and responsively in the past".¹³

In its implementation, the BUR called for an expanded role of both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard in CS as well as CSS roles and missions. It stated: " We plan to expand the role of Army Reserve Component CS and CSS units in key areas to provide additional support for Army combat units and other US forces involved in combat operations".¹⁴ Under the BUR the Army National Guard was also planned to transition to a combat force of approximately 37 brigades, which would make up eight Guard Divisions and also include 15 Enhanced Readiness National Guard Brigades.

Additional roles and missions changes for the Reserve Components were also clearly spelled out in the body of the CORM. The CORM recommendations included the request to: "Size and shape Reserve Component forces according to principles reflecting Total Force needs".¹⁵ The CORM paid particular close attention to the Army when it stated that: "In particular, the Army, which has the largest Reserve Components, has a combat structure that exceeds requirements for fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. At the same time, the Army reports shortages in deployable support forces".¹⁶ The CORM recommended the application of five general principles for sizing, shaping, and employing the Total Force to better integrate Reserve Components:¹⁷

1. The Total Force should be sized and shaped to meet the military requirements of the national security strategy.
2. Not all units need to maintain the same level of readiness. The Secretary of Defense should fully implement the policy of "tiered" resource allocation.
3. Reserve Component forces with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill force shortfalls in higher priority areas. For example, the Army has eight National Guard combat divisions with approximately 110,000 personnel spaces that were required for possible war with the former Soviet Union, but they are not needed for the current national security strategy. At the same time, the Army estimates that there is a shortage of 60,000 combat support and combat service support troops to adequately

support the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps in two regional conflicts.

4. The Services should ensure that individuals and units of the Reserve Components are fully incorporated into all relevant operational plans and actually used in the execution of those plans.

5. Greater integration and cooperation is required between the Active and Reserve Components.

Since the CORM was published in May of 1995, many initiatives which correspond to the CORM recommendations have been or are being accomplished. These initiatives have been accomplished slowly and with much trepidation on the sides of both the Active and Reserve Components. Although concerned with the loss of combat structure, the Army National Guard has been especially pro-active in its support of the BUR and CORM with its Army National Guard Division Redesign initiatives. The Army National Guard Division Redesign concept was developed and approved by the National Guard's 54 state/territory Adjutant Generals in February of 1996 and proposes the following:¹⁸

1. The Army National Guard (ARNG) Division Redesign Study examined alternatives to convert existing low priority combat units to support forces. The plan is to inactivate 12 ARNG combat brigades and use the generated force structure to form two combined arms divisions and an additional six combined arms brigades consisting of CS/CSS units. These 42,700 conversions will reduce the Army's CS/CSS shortages to 15,700 - an acceptable level of risk. To further the goal of AC/RC integration, the Army will develop an

implementation plan to form and test two new AC/RC divisions.

2. Based on the ARNG Division Redesign Plan, the ARNG will consist of eight divisions at endstate. Three divisions will remain as currently organized. In three additional divisions, one divisional brigade will be inactivated in each division and replaced by an enhanced brigade. Two combined arms divisions will be formed by converting existing divisional structure to CS/CSS units. In addition, six combined arms brigades, containing CS/CSS organizations will be formed. Six Enhanced Brigades will remain as currently organized and six would become part of an AC/RC division test.

3. The Army will study and test an ARNG proposal to form two new divisions by merging six enhanced brigades -- three brigades per division with an Active Component division headquarters of 250-300 soldiers.

The Army National Guard Division Redesign objectives are to reduce CSS shortfalls within the Total Army, to increase the relevance of the Army National Guard Divisions and make them more a part of the Total Army, and to help in building a seamless integration between the Active Army and the Army National Guard. As the US military becomes more and more involved in peace operations this integration between the Active and Reserve Components has become more and more visible in the Army's day-to-day operations.

The US Military and the Impact of Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and MOOTW Missions on US military operations: One of the primary means of collective security as practiced by the UN

and the US today is commonly known as peace operations. The document that provides current guidance and direction to the United States military on Peace Operations is *Presidential Decision Directive 25* (PDD 25). PDD 25 was signed by President Bill Clinton on 3 May 1994. It lays out the President's and his administration's comprehensive policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. This policy directive addresses six major issues for reforming and improving peace operations:¹⁹

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support -- both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with US troops.
2. Reducing US costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves.
3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations.
4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations.
5. Improving the way the US government manages and funds peace operations.
6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peace operations.

Due to the recent emphasis on MOOTW missions, US military forces including both the Active and Reserve Component, have been

extremely active since the end of the Cold War. US forces have taken part in military actions, peace actions, and humanitarian aid in many locations and countries: "Panama, Iraq, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Macedonia as well as in the Los Angeles riots, Florida hurricane, mid-western flooding, western wild fires, and the efforts in counter drug smuggling. In addition, the US still maintains its forward presence activities in Europe, Saudi Arabia, Korea and other locations world wide. In fact, during the time when our military force structure and budget have decreased by almost 40 percent, the use of our military forces has increased by 300 percent".²⁰

As the number and size of US Peacekeeping and MOOTW military operations has increased so has the cost increased. These continuing problems with the nations budget and other budgetary problems with modernizing and fielding the force have resulted in yet another military study being Congressionally mandated.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): The QDR is a product of the report from the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM). One of the primary - and currently one of the most controversial - outcomes of the CORM is the recommendation for a comprehensive review of strategy and forces

at the start of each new Presidential Administration. The recommendation of the CORM called for, "An overarching strategic plan, that conveys the essential purposes of the Department of Defense in the context of the Administration's agenda, and is the foundation for guidance to the Department of Defense. Therefore, the QDR should address international political and economic trends, changes in threats and military technology, evolving opportunities for using military force to shape the security environment, resources available for defense, possible adjustments to existing national security policy or strategy, and a diverse set of military force and program options." ²¹

The CORM recommendation for a QDR was approved by Congress under the Lieberman Defense Amendment to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act. Under the 1997 Defense Authorization Act the QDR is to include the following:²²

1. The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the defense strategy of the United States, and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy.
2. The threats examined for purpose of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of the threats.
3. The assumptions used in the review, including those relating to the cooperation of allies and mission sharing, levels of acceptable risk, warning times, and intensity and duration of conflict.

4. The effect on the force structure of preparations for and participation in peace operations and military operations other than war.

5. The effects on the force structure of the utilization by the armed forces of technologies anticipated to be available by 2005, including precision-guided munitions, stealth, night vision, digitization, and communication, and the changes in doctrine and operational concepts that would result from the use of such technologies.

6. The manpower and sustainment policies required under the defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting more than 120 days.

7. The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment needed to ensure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions.

8. The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces under the defense strategy, including in particular the appropriate number and size of headquarters units and defense agencies for that purpose.

9. The airlift and sealift capabilities required to support the defense strategy.

10. The forward presence, prepositioning and other anticipatory deployments needed under the defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.

11. The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.

12. The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the defense strategy.

13. Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.

With the QDR still not completed, the Active Army continues to actively compete with its Reserve Components and the other services for a substantial share of the roles, missions, and force structure budget. All major roles, missions and force structure changes since 1989 have included a huge push by the Active Army to retain the maximum amount of combat structure in the active forces and give the CS and CSS roles and missions to the Reserve Components. So far, the Army has been provided the resources to be able to fund and maintain its 10 Division Active Army force.

With the currently increasing pressure to balance the budget and reduce the deficit, Congress sees the QDR as the proper tool to correctly size, organize and reduce the military. The two previous attempts through the BUR and the CORM are now regarded as producing a combination of active and reserve force structure too large and too expensive for current needs.

The redistribution of CS and CSS roles and missions brought about by the BUR and the CORM has dramatically changed the structure of the Reserve Components. As these CS and CSS roles and missions are transferred into the Reserve Components the only Reserve Component Combat Arms structure remaining is the Army

National Guard. If these Combat Arms roles and missions are completely removed from the Reserve Components through the QDR process, then where is the combat reserve of the US Army in the event of war? Simply - it doesn't exist.

The current size of the federal deficit and the history of the US military clearly point out the fact that the nation cannot afford nor has it ever been willing to support the necessary Active Component Combat Arms forces required to defend the nation from a serious threat. Thus, what needs to be done is to realistically look at the Nations strategy, interests and other obligations and then develop a logical force package composed of both Active and Reserve Component forces to adequately cover the interests of the United States both at home and abroad.

Conclusion/Recommendation: In the Authors view, the Army National Guard Division Redesign Plan is an attempt by the National Guard to be a part in building a fully integrated, fully functional and fully capable United States Army. Its now time for both the Active Army and its Reserve Components to forget about old animosities and look into the future to build a viable organization which takes into account the best and most cost

effective options available and uses them to build the future Army.

END NOTES

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¹⁴ Ibid., 93.

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